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Abstract 
 
While shale gas is a prospective energy source, it is known to bring environmental deficits to the 
drilling neighborhood. Because of such concerns, property values fluctuate upon the possibility 
of shale gas fracturing. This paper examines the change in housing prices before and after the 
release of the 13
th
 onshore oil and gas licensing round, which took place in 2008 when shale gas 
was increasingly being considered as the alternative to ease the United Kingdom’s dependency 
on coal. Results suggest that the 2008 licensing has caused a 3% decrease in housing price 
growth rate for the licensed areas. 
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1 Introduction 
 
With cost-reducing technological innovation such as hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, 
shale gas is becoming an increasingly promising source of energy. With the energy shift 
suggested by the United States’ initiation of the shale energy boom, shale gas has gradually 
attracted more attention in other countries with shale reserves. The shale gas boom in the U.S. 
has recently boosted domestic energy companies and the persistent effort has resulted in shale 
gas exploration becoming more commercially viable. The boom has led some scholars to believe 
that shale gas will be able to support global energy needs for the next sixty years, especially with 
the large reserves that are being identified, drawing various countries' interest into their potential 
wells. While shale gas is receiving a lot of attention as an important energy supply, its 
exploration has worried many because of its environmental risks. The most prominent concerns 
include groundwater contamination, surface water contamination, noise, light, air pollution, 
traffic congestion and road damage (Muehlenbachs, Spiller & Timmins, 2014). 
Onshore shale gas production was first proposed in the United Kingdom in 2007, which 
naturally brought a lot of attention to shale gas fracturing. However, even though test wells were 
drilled, there has been no commercial drilling in the U.K. One of the U.K.’s shale gas 
forerunners, Caudrilla faced some setbacks in the process of pursuing a test well and was 
regulated to a halt due to unstable seismic activity and has also encountered local council’s 
deferment; however, despite such obstacles, shale gas is still considered a prominent energy 
strategy in the U.K. Active drilling has significant economic benefits not only with respect to 
possible independence from fossil fuel but also for the local communities where the drilling sites 
are located. The local economic gains include job creation, lower bills and tax revenues. Drilling 
companies are also willing to provide incentives to the communities by paying approximately 
100,000 GBP as a community benefit and sharing one percent of the production revenue.  
The purpose of this paper is to identify the impact of shale gas hydraulic fracturing on the 
housing market in the United Kingdom. Whether property values will be affected by shale gas 
development remains controversial. There are claims in the media complaining about the drop in 
housing prices for regions in vicinity of the exploration wells while the articles were dismissed 
for lack of evidence by the British Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). DECC 
countered the news release, arguing real estate values should not be affected by shale gas 
operations as it did not by other oil and gas exploration over the past half a century. In order to 
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provide more insight into the debate, this paper analyzes the change in housing prices in light of 
the release of the onshore licensing in 2008 by implementing the hedonic demand theory. First, I 
will match licensed output areas with non-licensed output areas that have the closest resemblance 
in household and neighborhood attributes. Then, I will measure the difference-in-difference of 
the mean prices of post-treatment and pre-treatment. I will do the same for the natural log of the 
mean prices in the hopes that the results will exemplify the effect of shale gas fracturing on the 
housing market. 
The next section discusses current literature that is relevant to the paper, particularly with 
regards to academic research conducted on property pricing and the impact of shale gas 
development. The following section describes how the research was conducted and what kind of 
empirical framework was utilized. Section 4 describes the data followed by the results in Section 
5 and conclusion in Section 6. 
 
 
2 Background 
 
Throughout literature, it is evident that neighborhood environmental quality is an inevitable 
factor in property valuation. A number of research projects examine how different sources of 
contamination impact property prices to what magnitude (e.g. Henrik, Jonsson & Ögren, 2010), 
and other projects conduct experimental research on consumers’ willingness-to-pay to avoid risk 
of environmental damages such as the protection of local watersheds (e.g. Bernstein, Kinnaman 
& Wu, 2013). Similar research has been done regarding environmental disruption caused by 
shale gas (Siikamaki & Krupnick, 2014). Siikamaki & Krupnick, 2014 conducts a study targeting 
the public on stated preference regarding risk related to shale gas in Pennsylvania and Texas.  
With the presence of environmental disamenities, it is indisputable that home buyers are going to 
react to the sign. 
With respect to academic research on shale gas, shale gas studies in the U.S., particularly 
about Pennsylvania and Texas, should be noted as the pioneer pieces. With Klaiber and 
Gopalakrishnan (2012) as one of the first academic projects that investigated the impact of shale 
gas wells in Pennsylvania, Muehlenbachs, et al., 2014 discusses the hedonic estimates of housing 
values from shale gas development in Pennsylvania and New York in more depth. The research 
focuses on quantifying the numerous costs and benefits of shale gas exploration in an area, 
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including that brought on by the “boom town” phenomenon, where the developmental areas face 
population increase, employment opportunities, active business activities, increased crime rates, 
increased housing rental costs and pollution. The paper looks at four major impact categories: 
adjacency effects, groundwater contamination risk, vicinity effects and macro effects. In sum, the 
average effect of shale gas development is less than one percent according to the research. It 
argues that there is a large negative impact on groundwater-dependent homes whereas relatively 
smaller positive impact on piped-water-dependent homes and goes into more detail with regards 
the vicinity level as well as the positive externalities of shale gas development on smaller towns 
This paper is particularly powerful in that it was able to identify housing sales at what stage was 
most heavily impacted versus the long-term impact of the wells. 
The literature concerning environmental problems mainly delves into the negative 
externalities that human development has had and provides insight on the magnitude of the 
negative impact. Since shale gas in the United Kingdom has barely had any noticeable 
externalities or damages, I would like to tailor my analysis to the earlier development stage in the 
United Kingdom and observe the public perception on the new energy source rather than 
restricting it to a specific observable concern. Based on some of the implications from  
Muehlenbachs, et al., 2014, there seems to be possible positive impacts when drilling companies 
provide partial lease payments. However, payment in the form of community benefit did not 
have as positive of an impact as the lease payment, which is what exploring companies are 
currently offering. Thus, I hypothesized that there would be a decrease in housing prices but 
because it was only a perceived cost, housing prices would not plummet heavily. 
I would eventually like to advance this research into an academic inquiry of several 
rounds of examination in order to successfully diagnose the influence that shale gas has on 
consumption behavior. Literature on shale gas in the U.K. is scare, which is why I believe that 
this paper is valuable in that it provides new information to academia and is especially effective 
because the exploratory progress of shale gas in the U.K. is still at its introductory level and thus, 
this addition of knowledge could advise on directions for environmental policy regarding 
granting permission for and imposing regulations on drillers to explore shale gas. 
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3 Method 
 
3.1 Hedonic Pricing Model 
 
This paper actively utilizes the hedonic pricing model like many other literatures that implements 
the method in order to measure the value or cost of environmental amenities that are capitalized 
in the market price (Klaiber & Gopalakrishnan, 2012). Hedonic pricing model hypothesizes that 
the price of a good is a function of its attributes. Hedonic price refers to the implicit price of the 
good’s attributes and is observable through differentiated products (Rosen, 1974). In other 
words, if there were two identical regions with respect to all other attributes except for the 
treatment variable, the difference in price would indicate consumers’ willingness-to-pay for the 
treatment. For this research, we will assume a linear hedonic price function and homogeneous 
preferences in order to diagnose the simplified effect of the licenses.
1
 
 In this study, the composite good is a property and the treatment variable is the presence 
of the 2008 license. Given that A = [a1, …, an] captures housing attributes and L is a treatment 
dummy that takes the value 1 if a property is located within a 2008 license area, the hedonic 
price function for the property is 
          (1)  
Because consumers’ willingness-to-pay is optimally equal to the market price of the commodity, 
consumers’ willingness-to-pay and marginal willingness-to-pay can be expressed as 
            (2)  
 
     
       
  
 (3)  
This demonstrates that the coefficient that is yielded as the result represents the change in 
property value depending on the change in licensing status (Andersson, Jonsson & Ögren, 2009). 
 Moreover, it is important to note that the license attribute is an aspect borne from 
consumer expectation. Consumers expect the property to change a certain way and alter their 
decision (i.e. willingness-to-pay) based on this anticipation. 
 
 
                                                        
1 The linear hedonic price function is not realistic in most empirical settings (Bishop & Timmins, 2011). 
However, the model is utilized in order to provide a simplified representation of the price change situation 
rather than to precisely replicate reality. 
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3.2 Nearest-neighbor matching (NNM) estimator 
 
The nearest-neighbor matching estimator was used to identify matches based on treated areas 
and controlled areas. The teffects nnmatch function applies the NNM estimator for the average 
treatment effect (ATE) in this study. The function operates based on the binary-treatment 
potential-outcome model where t=1 is for licensed areas and t=0 is for unlicensed, controlled 
areas. Let    be the potential outcome when treatment occurs and    be the potential outcome of 
where the treatment does not occur. The basic mechanism of ATE is to find 
             (4)  
Because the treatment is binary,     and     cannot happen together. The NNM estimator uses 
the different attributes to match the most similar observations that are in different treatment 
levels (Abadie, Drukker, Herr & Imbens, 2004). The assumption here is that the treatment’s 
effect is localized and that the treatment status is not correlated with other household or 
neighborhood attributes. In light of the purpose of the study, shale reserves do not impact 
household composition or socioeconomic characteristics of the residents neither is it the 
fundamental foundation for the United Kingdom’s housing distributions. Therefore, the 
assumption seems to be reasonable. 
 The NNM estimator was conducted for two observation variables: the difference between 
the mean pre-treatment and post-treatment prices and the difference between the change in mean 
pre-treatment and post-treatment prices. Moreover, the match number was controlled for match = 
1, 4, 10, 15 and 20 matches for each observation variable. 
 
 
 3.3 Difference-in-Difference of mean prices 
 
The double-difference nearest neighbor matching is utilized in order to avoid time variation 
(Muehlenbachs, et al., 2014). For each output area, the average prices for all years before 
licensing (i.e. transactions from 2003 to 2007) and after licensing (i.e. transactions from 2009 to 
2013) were taken. Transactions for 2008 were not included in the analysis. All prices were 
normalized with the relevant year’s housing price index to be in constant pounds. Then the 
difference between the post price and pre price was taken, which was used as one of the 
observation variables when conducting the NNM estimator. For instance,  
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                   (5)  
                   (6)  
                    (7)  
 
where:   is the output area that will be licensed in 2008 
      is the mean price of all transactions after 2008 for area A 
     is the mean price of all transactions before 2008 for area A 
  is the control area 
      is the mean price of all transactions after 2008 for area B 
     is the mean price of all transactions before 2008 for area B 
 
The results from this observation variable represent how the change in prices in a license area is 
different from that in a non-licensed area. 
 
 
3.4 Difference-in-Difference of change in mean prices 
 
Likewise, instead of taking the difference between the prices in section 3.3, the natural log for 
each pre and post prices were taken. Subsequently, the difference between the natural logs was 
taken and was run in the estimator. 
                              (8)  
                              (9)  
                             (10)  
This observation variable demonstrates the difference in the growth rate in prices of a licensed 
area versus that of a non-licensed area. 
 
 
4 Data 
 
4.1 Housing transaction data 
 
Housing transaction data originated from the Land Registry Price Paid Data at data.gov.uk. The 
data was originally organized in months, and I restricted them to the period 2003 to 2013 for the 
purpose of this research. In the process of clean up, transactions that did not have identifiable 
output areas were deleted. The dataset consisted of 19,728,346 observations, indicating that there 
were 19,728,346 transactions between 2003 and 2013.  
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4.2 Household and neighborhood demographic data 
 
 Housing attributes were obtained from the United Kingdom census at the Office for 
National Statistics. All data was collected from the British Census for 2001. The data was 
collected for 2001 in order to base all attributes and information on the pre-treatment stage. Data 
for individual attributes were collected and compiled. Housing attributes that were used as 
control variables include (for full variable list, see Appendix A.2): 
 
Code Category 
UV02  Population Density 
UV03  Sex 
UV09  Ethnic Group 
UV24 Education Qualifications 
UV31 National Statistics Socioeconomic Classification 
UV34  Industry of Employment 
UV50  Approximated Social Grade 
UV51 Number of People in Households 
UV56  Accommodation Type: Household Spaces 
UV57  Number of Rooms 
UV63  Tenure Households 
UV65  Household Composition 
UV68  Household Type 
 
Other attributes, such as ethnic group, gender, education level, employment status, household 
tenure status, household type, household size and spatial composition, were chosen based on 
conventional urban literature. Some essential categories such as age and household income were 
not available on the output area level or had substitutes (Bajari & Kahn, 2005). For instance, 
household income has been replaced with industry of employment, approximate social grade and 
socioeconomic classification, which enables estimation of the household’s income level. 
Household composition, the relationship of the people living in the household, took the place of 
age; although not synonymous, the two categories both pointed towards family shape, which was 
an important aspect of comparing housing situations between two geographical areas. 
There were 175,434 observations in this dataset and 204 variables. While there are 
categories that are correlated, this is not significant because the attributes are only used for 
matching purposes and are not part of the coefficient calculation. Also, some variables are 
automatically eliminated by the program module due to collinearity. 
11 
 
 
4.3 13
th
 Onshore Oil and Gas Licensing Round 
 
 The data on treatment was created through a geographic information system software, 
ArcGIS, by compiling geographic data accessed from the Office of National Statistics for the 
output area map and DECC for the license and contour map (see Figure 1). 
 
4.4 Data organization 
 
Output areas were the basic unit of analysis; thus, postcodes were related the output areas 
during the organization process. Postcode to output area data was accessed through the Office of 
National Statistics. Transaction prices of each output area were averaged based on their 
transaction period as aforementioned. The mean price was dependent upon whether it happened 
pre-treatment (before 2008) or post-treatment (after 2008). Data for mean prices of transactions 
that happened in 2008 were not used because of the uncertainty of when consumer expectations 
took place relative to the licensing year. Consequently, there were 173,024 output areas with 
observations for which the analysis could be conducted on. 
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Figure 1: Licensed Blocks from 13
th
 Onshore Licensing Round 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Results 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
       Match = 1 4 10 15 20 average 
DID in P_mean -6031.663 -6166.181 -6162.12 -6156.979 -6156.863 -6134.7612 
DID in ln(P_mean) -0.0349793 -0.0358497 -0.0360717 -0.0360822 -0.0360922 -0.03581502 
       Note: The first column demonstrates the results for the geographical difference in difference of mean prices of pre-
treatment and post-treatment. The unit for the first column is in pound sterling normalized to 2001. The second column 
shows the results for the geographical difference in difference of the natural log of mean prices of pre-treatment and 
post-treatment. The unit for the second column is in decimals and can be represented as a percent increase.  
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Match = 1 indicates that there were one set of output areas each in different treatment levels that 
were matched for best similarity among other variables (i.e. housing attributes). According to the 
first column of Table 1, licensing caused housing prices to decrease by approximately 6,031.66 
GBP and the growth rate of housing prices decreased by 3.50% with the presence of the license. 
Similarly, column 2 show the results when the neighboring matches are set to four matches. 
Licensing caused housing prices to decrease by approximately 6166.18 GBP and the housing 
price growth rate to decrease by 3.58%. The same analyses were conducted on ten, fifteen and 
twenty matches. The average effect of licensing was a 6,162.12 GBP drop and 3.61% reduction 
in housing price growth rate. 
 
Table 2: Difference between mean of pre- and post-licensed prices 
               Match = 20 
Treatment-effects estimation 
 
Number of obs = 173024 
Estimator: nearest-neighbor matching 
 
Matches requested = 20 
Outcome model: matching 
 
min = 20 
Distance metric: Mahalanobis 
 
max = 21 
       
  
Al Robust 
    mean_norm_~f Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ATE 
      License_Join 
      (1 vs 0) -6156.863 409.3174 -15.04 0 -6959.11 -5354.615 
 
 
Table 3: Difference between natural log of mean pre- and post-licensed prices 
               Match = 20 
Treatment-effects estimation 
 
Number of obs = 173024 
Estimator: nearest-neighbor matching 
 
Matches requested = 20 
Outcome model: matching 
 
min = 20 
Distance metric: Mahalanobis 
 
max = 21 
       
  
Al Robust 
    ln_mean_norm_~f Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ATE 
      License_Join 
      (1 vs 0) -0.0360922 0.003324 -10.86 0 -0.0426072 -0.0295773 
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The number of matches used does make a difference. Too few matches makes the data 
rely on too little information whereas a large number of matches forces NNM estimator to 
generate statistics from non-similar areas. Because the sample size is large (n = 173,024) relative 
to the number of matches (max = 20), it is likely that the aforementioned sacrifice in forcing non-
similar matches is slim. Although it is not clear what the optimal number of matches is, the 
results shown above demonstrate that the matching mechanism is effective given the stability of 
the results despite the number of matches. Moreover, P > |z| for all ten results approximate to 
zero, implying that all the results are significant and that there is a difference between the 
difference between licensed areas and the non-licensed controlled areas. This implies that home 
buyers value the environmental well-being of their house and neighborhood more than the 
potential economic perks such as the community benefit provided in the form of initial bulk 
payment as well as a possible revenue stream given active utilization of the well. Home buyers 
expect disamenities caused by environmental development to be of greater loss than the financial 
payment and the conceivable boom. 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I aimed to study the consequences that the 13
th
 round of onshore oil and gas 
licensing would bring to the public’s reaction with respect to their purchasing behavior in the 
housing market. I examined the change in housing prices and the change in the growth rate of 
housing prices before and after the licensing period and found the difference between these 
differences. Through this study, I was able to find out that housing prices dropped by 
approximately 6,134.76 GBP and the growth rate of housing prices dropped by approximately 
3.58% on average due to the release of the licensing. This is particularly significant considering 
that the effects of shale gas exploration have not yet taken place and the results were solely a 
reaction founded on consumers’ expectation. As the United Kingdom is on its launching stage of 
shale gas exploitation, it would be eminent to consider these valuations in the public policy 
debate. 
There are several limitations to this research. First, conducting a difference-in-differences 
analysis assumes that the locations that have been matched will trend in the same manner if it 
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were not licensed. In other words, the assumption is that the change in the non-licensed area is 
identical to that of the licensed area if it were not treated. While the consistency of the results 
provides some evidence that the matches are well-paired, this is uncertain and is theoretically 
difficult to replicate. 
 Moreover, there are several ambiguities in the assumptions. The hypothesis assumes that 
everybody in the U.K. is well aware of the licensing status and updates of their regions. 
Although there are articles that show that licensing rounds have been covered in the media such 
as the news
2
, it is uncertain as to how prevalent the knowledge of permits is. On the other hand, 
it is also possible for people to refrain from purchasing property before the permit is granted if 
they are aware that a geographical block is being offered in the coming licensing round. For this 
limitation, it would be helpful to recognize the most popular source of information the local 
people use and conduct research through that route in order to ensure that people are acting with 
the knowledge of shale gas development in the area. 
Additionally, because the U.K. started gaining interest in 2007 and the idea of shale gas 
fracturing was viable, this analysis considers all blocks that received the 13
th
 licensing to be 
interested in testing shale gas. This can be reasonable since the study is measuring consumer 
expectations; home buyers would be aware of the possibility of fracturing and act accordingly. 
However, it would have been helpful to know whether there were different routes that the public 
was gathering shale gas news. By being aware of this route, it would have been possible to 
acknowledge whether some areas are being mentioned more often than others with respect to 
company’s interest in drilling. Consequently, the locations that were mentioned more often could 
have experienced a harsher outcome. 
For future research, it would be beneficial to examine sources that are more public 
friendly. For instance, using media coverage as the treatment could be a powerful component 
because news media is a more accessible source of information and everyday knowledge for the 
public. For such study, it would be valuable to have a treatment variable that gives variance in 
degree among the output areas by using factors such as the frequency of coverage or the number 
of distributor publishing the content. A case study on a relatively active area such as Lancashire 
                                                        
2 For example, news article regarding recent permission to drill for shale gas. “Fracking firm gains permits to 
drill for gas in Lancashire,” Lancashire Telegraph, 8 February 2015. 
http://www.lancashiretelegraph.co.uk/news/11778913.Fracking_firm_gains_permits_to_drill_for_gas_in_Lan
cashire/ 
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would be beneficial in order to examine whether the results are applicable to empirical cases. 
Furthermore, the continuation on the current research topic on licensing would be interesting 
with the 14
th
 licensing round, which is anticipated to be finalized in 2015. 
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Appendix A.1 
Nearest-neighbor matching estimator results  
Table 4: Difference between mean pre- and post-licensed prices 
               Match = 1 
Treatment-effects estimation 
 
Number of obs = 173024 
Estimator: nearest-neighbor matching 
 
Matches requested = 1 
Outcome model: matching 
 
min = 1 
Distance metric: Mahalanobis 
 
max = 2 
       
  
Al Robust 
    mean_norm_~f Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ATE 
      License_Join 
      (1 vs 0) -6031.663 487.5214 -12.37 0 -6987.188 -5076.139 
 
Table 5: Difference between natural log of mean pre- and post-licensed prices 
               Match = 1 
Treatment-effects estimation 
 
Number of obs = 173024 
Estimator: nearest-neighbor matching 
 
Matches requested = 1 
Outcome model: matching 
 
min = 1 
Distance metric: Mahalanobis 
 
max = 2 
       
  
Al Robust 
    mean_norm_~f Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ATE 
      License_Join 
      (1 vs 0) -0.0349793 0.0037786 -9.26 0 -0.0423852 -0.0275734 
 
Table 6: Difference between mean of pre- and post-licensed prices 
               Match = 4 
Treatment-effects estimation 
 
Number of obs = 173024 
Estimator: nearest-neighbor matching 
 
Matches requested = 4 
Outcome model: matching 
 
min = 4 
Distance metric: Mahalanobis 
 
max = 4 
       
  
Al Robust 
    mean_norm_~f Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ATE 
      License_Join 
      (1 vs 0) -6166.181 452.7 -13.62 0 -7053.456 -5278.905 
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Table 7: Difference between natural log of mean pre- and post-licensed prices 
               Match = 4 
Treatment-effects estimation 
 
Number of obs = 173024 
Estimator: nearest-neighbor matching 
 
Matches requested = 4 
Outcome model: matching 
 
min = 4 
Distance metric: Mahalanobis 
 
max = 4 
       
  
Al Robust 
    ln_mean_norm_~f Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ATE 
      License_Join 
      (1 vs 0) -0.0358497 0.0035835 -10 0 -0.0428732 -0.0288262 
 
 
Table 8: Difference between mean of pre- and post-licensed prices 
               Match = 10 
Treatment-effects estimation 
 
Number of obs = 173024 
Estimator: nearest-neighbor matching 
 
Matches requested = 10 
Outcome model: matching 
 
min = 10 
Distance metric: Mahalanobis 
 
max = 11 
       
  
Al Robust 
    mean_norm_~f Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ATE 
      License_Join 
      (1 vs 0) -6162.12 430.3544 -14.32 0 -7005.599 -5318.64 
 
 
Table 9: Difference between natural log of mean pre- and post-licensed prices 
               Match = 10 
Treatment-effects estimation 
 
Number of obs = 173024 
Estimator: nearest-neighbor matching 
 
Matches requested = 10 
Outcome model: matching 
 
min = 10 
Distance metric: Mahalanobis 
 
max = 11 
       
  
Al Robust 
    ln_mean_norm_~f Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ATE 
      License_Join 
      (1 vs 0) -0.0360717 0.0034496 -10.46 0 -0.0428328 -0.0293107 
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Table 10: Difference between mean of pre- and post-licensed prices 
               Match = 15 
Treatment-effects estimation 
 
Number of obs = 173024 
Estimator: nearest-neighbor matching 
 
Matches requested = 15 
Outcome model: matching 
 
min = 15 
Distance metric: Mahalanobis 
 
max = 16 
       
  
Al Robust 
    mean_norm_~f Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ATE 
      License_Join 
      (1 vs 0) -6156.979 418.1061 -14.73 0 -6976.452 -5337.506 
 
 
Table 11: Difference between natural log of mean pre- and post-licensed prices 
               Match = 15 
Treatment-effects estimation 
 
Number of obs = 173024 
Estimator: nearest-neighbor matching 
 
Matches requested = 15 
Outcome model: matching 
 
min = 15 
Distance metric: Mahalanobis 
 
max = 16 
       
  
Al Robust 
    ln_mean_norm_~f Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
ATE 
      License_Join 
      (1 vs 0) -0.0360822 0.0033777 -10.68 0 -0.0427025 -0.0294619 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A.2 
 
Table 12: Housing Attributes Variable List 
 
Code Category Variable List 
UV02  Population Density 
All People 
Area (Hectares) 
Density (Number of Persons per Hectare) 
UV03  Sex 
All People 
Males 
Females 
UV09  Ethnic Group 
All People 
White 
White: British 
White: Irish 
White: Other White 
Mixed 
Mixed: White and Black Caribbean 
Mixed: White and Black African 
Mixed: White and Asian 
Mixed: Other Mixed 
Asian or Asian British 
Asian or Asian British: Indian 
Asian or Asian British: Pakistani 
Asian or Asian British: Bangladeshi 
Asian or Asian British: Other Asian 
Black or Black British 
Black or Black British: Caribbean 
Black or Black British: African 
Black or Black British: Other Black 
Chinese or Other Ethnic Chinese or Other Ethnic Group: Chinese 
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Group 
Chinese or Other Ethnic Group: Other Ethnic Group 
UV24 
Education 
Qualifications 
All People 
No qualifications 
Level 1 qualifications 
Level 2 qualifications 
Level 3 qualifications 
Level 4 / 5 qualifications 
Other qualifications: Level unknown 
UV31 
National Statistics 
Socioeconomic 
Classification 
All People 
1. Higher managerial and 
professional occupations 
1.1 Large employers and higher 
managerial occupations 
L1 Employers in large organisations 
L2 Higher managerial 
1.2 Higher professional occupations 
L3.1 Higher professionals (traditional) - employees 
L3.2 Higher professionals (new) - employees 
L3.3 Higher professionals (traditional) - self-employed 
L3.4 Higher professionals (new) - self-employed 
2. Lower managerial and 
professional occupations 
L4.1 Lower professionals and higher technical (traditional) - employees 
L4.2 Lower professionals and higher technical (new) - employees 
L4.3 Lower professionals and higher technical (traditional) - self-employed 
L4.4 Lower professional and higher technical (new) - self employed 
L5 Lower managerial 
L6 Higher supervisory 
3. Intermediate 
occupations 
L7.1 Intermediate clerical and administrative 
L7.2 Intermediate sales and service 
L7.3 Intermediate technical and auxiliary 
L7.4 Intermediate engineering 
4. Small employers and 
own account workers 
L8.1 Employers in small organisations (non-professional) 
L8.2 Employers in small organisations (agriculture) 
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L9.1 Own account workers (non-professional) 
L9.2 Own account workers (agriculture) 
5. Lower supervisory and 
technical occupations 
L10 Lower supervisory 
L11.1 Lower technical craft 
L11.2 Lower technical process operative 
6. Semi-routine 
occupations 
L12.1 Semi-routine sales 
L12.2 Semi-routine service 
L12.3 Semi-routine technical 
L12.4 Semi-routine operative 
L12.5 Semi-routine agriculture 
L12.6 Semi-routine clerical 
L12.7 Semi-routine childcare 
7. Routine occupations 
L13.1 Routine sales and service 
L13.2 Routine production 
L13.3 Routine technical 
L13.4 Routine operative 
L13.5 Routine agricultural 
8. Never worked and long-
term unemployed 
L14.1 Never worked 
L14.2 Long-term unemployed 
Not Classified 
L15 Full-time students 
L17 Not classifiable for other reasons 
UV34  
Industry of 
Employment 
All People 
A. Agriculture, hunting and forestry 
B. Fishing 
C. Mining and quarrying 
D. Manufacturing 
E. Electricity, gas and water supply 
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F. Construction 
G. Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 
H. Hotels and restaurants 
I. Transport, storage and communications 
J. Financial intermediation 
K. Real estate, renting and business activities 
L. Public administration and defence, social security 
M. Education 
N. Health and social work 
O. Other community, social and personal service activities 
P. Private households with employed persons 
Q. Extra-territorial organisations and bodies 
UV50  
Approximated 
Social Grade 
All People Aged 16 and over in Households 
AB:  Higher and intermediate managerial / administrative / professional 
C1:  Supervisory,  clerical,  junior managerial / administrative / professional 
C2:  Skilled manual workers 
D:   Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers 
E:   On state benefit, unemployed, lowest grade workers 
UV51 
Number of People 
in Households 
All Occupied Household Spaces 
1 person living in Household 
2 people living in Household 
3 people living in Household 
4 people living in Household 
5 people living in Household 
6 people living in Household 
7 people living in Household 
8 or more people living in Household 
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UV56  
Accommodation 
Type: Household 
Spaces 
All Household Spaces 
In an Unshared Dwelling 
House or Bungalow 
Detached 
Semi-detached 
Terraced (including end-terrace) 
Flat, Maisonette or Apartment 
In a Purpose-Built Block of Flats 
Part of a Converted or Shared House 
In a Commercial Building 
Caravan or Other Mobile or Temporary Structure 
In a Shared Dwelling 
UV57  Number of Rooms 
All Occupied Household Spaces 
1 room 
2 rooms 
3 rooms 
4 rooms 
5 rooms 
6 rooms 
7 rooms 
8 or more rooms 
UV63  Tenure Households 
All Households 
Owned 
Owns outright 
Owns with a mortgage or loan 
Shared ownership 
Social rented 
Rented from Council (Local Authority) 
Other social rented 
Private rented 
Private landlord or letting agency 
Employer of a household member 
Relative or friend of a household member 
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Other 
Living rent free 
UV65  
Household 
Composition 
All Households 
One person 
Pensioner 
Other 
One family and no others 
All pensioners 
Married couple households 
No children 
With one dependent child 
With two or more dependent children 
All children non-dependent 
Cohabiting couple family households 
No children 
With one dependent child 
With two or more dependent children 
All children non-dependent 
Lone parent households 
With one dependent child 
With two or more dependent children 
All children non-dependent 
Other households 
With one dependent child 
With two or more dependent children 
All student 
All pensioner 
Other 
UV68  Household Type 
All Households 
Married couple household with dependent child(ren) 
Married couple household with no dependent child(ren) 
Cohabiting couple household with dependent child(ren) 
Cohabiting couple household with no dependent child(ren) 
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Lone parent household with dependent child(ren) 
Lone parent household with no dependent child(ren) 
One person household 
Multi person household: All student 
Multi person household: All other 
 
 
